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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sydney Lorelei Neal appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance. Neal 
contends the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance 
- methadone. (R., pp.25-26.) Neal filed a motion to dismiss claiming "the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing ... failed to establish that there 
was reasonable or probable cause to believe that [she] committed the crime for 
which she was held to answer." (R., pp.38-39.) Neal also filed a supporting 
memorandum specifically raising two issues: 
A) Does the presence of a controlled substance in a newborn 
child's blood present sufficient evidence to support a charge 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance against the 
mother? 
B) Did the state fail to provide adequate, competent evidence 
to establish probable cause on all the elements of the crime 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance at the preliminary 
hearing? 
(R., p.41.) 
The court denied Neal's motion. (R., pp.62-69.) Neal thereafter entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the felony possession charge, reserving her right to 
challenge the court's denial of her motion to dismiss. (R., p.72.) The court 
entered a withheld judgment and placed Neal on probation for five years. (R., 
pp.75-80.) Neal filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.) 
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ISSUE 
Neal states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss? 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Because the state presented sufficient evidence to find probable cause to 
bind Neal over on the charge of felony possession of a controlled substance, has 
Neal failed to establish error in the denial of her motion to dismiss? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
Neal Has Failed To Establish She Was Entitled To Dismissal Of The Felony 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance Charge Based On A Lack Of Probable 
Cause At The Preliminary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Neal contends the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss, 
arguing she was entitled to dismissal of "the State's information based upon the 
failure of the State to establish probable cause for every element of the charged 
offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) More specifically, Neal asserts the state failed 
to establish she "had both knowledge of the methadone and exercised dominion 
and control over the methadone found in her newborn's umbilical cord." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Neal's claim fails. The state presented substantial 
evidence at the preliminary hearing from which the magistrate could find 
probable cause to bind Neal over for felony possession of a controlled 
substance. As such, Neal has failed to establish error in. the district court's 
denial of her motion to dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that a defendant has 
committed an offense should be overturned only upon a showing that the 
magistrate abused its discretion." State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 504, 80 P.3d 
1103, 1105 (Ct. App. 2003). When the appellate court reviews a discretionary 
decision it considers whether the district court (1) perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
3 
kl (citation omitted). "The decision of a magistrate that there exists probable 
cause to hold a defendant to answer before the district court should be 
overturned only on a clear showing that the committing magistrate abused its 
discretion." State v. Mclellan, 154 Idaho 77, _, 294 P.3d 203, 204-05 (citation 
omitted). 
C. Neal Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Upholding The 
Magistrate's Probable Cause Determination 
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is quite limited. State v. Williams, 
103 Idaho 635, 644-45, 651 P.2d 569, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled on 
other grounds State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984). The 
finding of probable cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every 
material element of the offense charged, and this test may be satisfied through 
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho at 504, 80 P.3d at 1105; State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 
798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The state is not required to produce all of its 
evidence at a preliminary examination. Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 709, 429 
P.2d 836, 839 (1967). Rather, the state need only show that a crime was 
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it. 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("it is sufficient to 
state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing 
established that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would 
believe that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission of the 
offense charged"). Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for that of 
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the magistrate as to the weight of the evidence and a probable cause finding will 
not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible 
inferences, support findings that the offense occurred and the accused 
committed it. 19.:_ (citing State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664, 
667 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
The state charged Neal with a violation of l.C. § 37-2732(c) based on the 
allegation that "on or about the 4th day of April, 2011, . . . [Neal] did 
constructively possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methadone, a Schedule II 
controlled substance." (R., pp.5-6, 25.) The elements of this offense required 
the state to prove there was probable cause to believe Neal, on or about the 
date alleged, "possessed any amount of' methadone and that she knew it was 
methadone or believed it was a controlled substance. ICJI 403; see State v. 
Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 151, 983 P.2d 217, 224 (Ct. App. 1999) (possession 
offense requires proof of general intent - that the defendant "knowingly 
possessed a controlled substance, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the 
presence of a drug"). Possession can be established by proving actual physical 
possession or constructive possession. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 
P.2d 57, 66 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). To prove constructive possession, 
the state need only prove "dominion and control over the substance." Kopsa, 
126 Idaho at 521, 887 P.2d at 66 (citation omitted). "What is crucial to the 
state's proof is a sufficient showing of a nexus between the accused and the 
controlled substance." 19.:_ "Knowledge of the existence of controlled substances 
may be inferred through circumstances." 19.:_ 
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In Groce, the Court identified several circumstances "which may be used 
to find the requisite knowledge, other than the mere fact of possession." 133 
Idaho at 152, 983 P.2d at 225. Those circumstances include: 
the manner in which the drug was wrapped, stored or carried; 
attempts to conceal, dispose of or destroy the contraband; 
attempts to avoid detection or arrest; the presence of drug 
paraphernalia; the possession of other contraband or cutting 
agents; indications that the defendant was under the influence of 
drugs; the presence of fresh needle marks; as well as the 
proximity, accessibility and location of the contraband. 
Groce, 133 Idaho at 152, 983 P.2d at 225 (citation omitted). 
At the preliminary hearing, the state presented the testimony of Detective 
Chris McGilvery. (P.H. Tr., pp.1-11.) Detective McGilvery testified that he was 
dispatched to St. Luke's hospital on April 4, 2011, "to assist the Department of 
Health and Welfare with a baby which had been born and had tested positive for 
methadone." (P.H. Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.5.) As part of his investigation, 
Detective McGilvery made contact with Neal, the baby's mother. (P.H. Tr., p.4, 
Ls.6-19.) Detective McGilvery questioned Neal about her "use of opiates or 
other controlled substances." (P.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.6-9.) Because the infant tested 
positive for methadone, Detective McGilvery specifically asked Neal if she "had 
ever taken methadone or been prescribed methadone." (P.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.) 
Neal denied ever taking methadone or having a prescription for it. (P.H. Tr., p.7, 
Ls.2-3.) Neal did, however, admit "she had been taking hydrocodone," which 
had been lawfully prescribed to her. (P.H. Tr., p.7, Ls.8-12.) The state also 
submitted two exhibits - one demonstrating Neal "had a baby on 3/27/2011" and 
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the other showing "the hospital's findings regarding the methadone findings in 
cord tissue."1 (P.H. Tr., p.12, Ls.12-25.) 
Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the court 
found sufficient evidence that Neal possessed a controlled substance without a 
prescription. (P.H. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-18.) The district court agreed the evidence 
was sufficient for purposes of probable cause. (R., pp.64-68.) 
Neal "does not contest that methadone was found in the umbilical cord 
blood of her baby" and "does not dispute that she did not have a prescription for 
methadone." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) "What Ms. Neal does challenge is that [sic] 
the district court's conclusion that because methadone was present in the 
umbilical cord blood of B.N., she 'possessed' methadone in violation of l.C. § 37-
27329(c)." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Application of the standards governing 
probable cause to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing shows Neal 
has failed to establish error in the denial of her motion to dismiss. 
As an initial matter, Neal contends "actual possession is not an issue, as 
both the Complaint and the Information charged her specifically with constructive 
possession of the methadone." (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis original).) 
Although the state's charging documents allege constructive possession, Neal is 
incorrect in her assertion that this foreclosed the magistrate from finding 
1 The actual exhibits have not been included in the record on appeal. (See R., 
p.91 (Certificate of Exhibits).) In fact, Exhibits 1 and 2 from the preliminary 
hearing were filed under seal. (R., pp.59-60.) To the extent the exhibits are 
necessary to this Court's review of the probable cause determination, the 
"[m]issing portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the 
trial court." State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. 
App. 1999). 
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sufficient evidence of the elements of the offense based on a theory of actual 
possession. The Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. Mclellan, 154 
Idaho 77, 294 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2013), does not compel a contrary conclusion. 
In Mclellan, the state charged a specific theory of video voyeurism under 
l.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) and argued that theory to the district court. 154 Idaho at 
_, 294 P.3d at 205. The district court found a lack of probable cause on the 
asserted theory and dismissed the case. kl at_, 294 P.3d at 204. The state 
appealed and the Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that the magistrate 
was required to decide whether probable cause existed under any theory 
regardless of whether the state asserted it. kl at_, 294 P.3d at 205. The 
Court concluded, "the magistrate is entitled to rely on the theory and argument 
set forth by the state. There is no requirement that the magistrate search the 
record and the law to find alternate theories of the case for the state to proceed 
under." kl The Court did not, however, hold that a magistrate was prohibited 
from doing so. To the contrary, the Court expressly stated, "We do not hold that 
a magistrate may not determine that an alternative theory exists under which the 
state may wish to proceed. kl at_ n.2, 294 P.3d at 205 n.2. Thus, nothing 
precluded the magistrate in this case from finding probable cause regardless of 
the allegation that the possession was constructive, not actual. Indeed, the 
nature of the possession is not even an element of the offense that requires a 
finding of probable cause, Reyes, supra, which also distinguishes this case from 
Mclellan. Finally, Neal has presented no scenario in which actual possession 
would not also constitute constructive possession under the facts of this case. 
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Because Neal contends "actual possession is not an issue," her argument 
focuses on the requirements for showing constructive possession, i.e., dominion 
and control over the substance. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Neal also asserts 
the state failed to prove knowledge of the substance. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-
11.) More specifically, Neal argues "the mere presence of the substance in the 
blood" is insufficient to establish either knowledge or dominion and control. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Neal is incorrect. 
In support of her argument, Neal cites cases from six other jurisdictions 
for the proposition that the "majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that 
the mere presence of a controlled substance in an individual's body does not 
constitute possession within the meaning of criminal statutes." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.15 (citations omitted).) To the extent the cases Neal cites establish a "majority 
rule," that "rule" is that a positive drug result is not, alone, sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of possessing the 
drug for which she tested positive. However, as noted in many of the cases 
upon which Neal relies, a positive drug test is circumstantial evidence of 
possession and, in conjunction with other evidence, may be sufficient to prove 
the defendant is guilty of possession. In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 795 
(Mont. 2005) (citations omitted); State v. Vorm, 570 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991) ("We find the mere presence of cocaine metabolites in a blood or 
urine sample, without additional evidence, does not constitute prima facie 
evidence of knowing and voluntary possession of cocaine."); State v. Lewis, 394 
N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("We find that evidence of a controlled 
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substance in a person's urine specimen does not establish possession within the 
meaning of [the statute], nor is it sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove prior 
possession beyond a reasonable doubt absent probative corroborating evidence 
of actual physical possession."); State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 212 (Kan. 
1983) ("Discovery of a drug in a person's blood is circumstantial evidence 
tending to prove prior possession of the drug, but it is not sufficient evidence to 
establish guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."). As explained by the Montana 
Supreme Court: 
[O]nce a substance is ingested and then assimilated into the 
bloodstream, the person who ingested it does cease to exercise 
dominion and control over the substance. However, like many of 
those jurisdictions which have addressed this issue, we also 
conclude that the presence of an illegal substance in the body 
constitutes circumstantial evidence of prior possession of that 
substance. The theory is that in order to have ingested the drug 
the person had to have possessed it, if even for a short period of 
time. 
In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 795 (Mont. 2005) (citations omitted). 
Although some other jurisdictions have found a positive drug test alone is 
insufficient to prove possession, there are two reasons to reject that approach in 
this case.2 First, those cases involve the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; they do not address the sufficiency of 
evidence for finding probable cause. The district court found this distinction 
2 Although not directly on point, the Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded that 
"[e]vidence of the presence of methamphetamine in [a defendant's] blood, alone, 
does not demonstrate his knowledge of the drug in the vehicle beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638, 262 P.3d 278, 281 
(Ct. App. 2011 ). This conclusion does not control here because, as noted, 
actual possession could support the charge against Neal. 
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significant, and rightly so. (R., p.67.) As noted by the district court, the "lower 
standard" at a preliminary hearing "allows the magistrate to consider 
circumstantial evidence and make reasonable inferences based on the 
evidence." (R., p.67.) Neal's "knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances, namely the presence of methadone in the cord tissue coupled 
with [Neal's] prior history of prescription drug use," and "the presence of 
methadone, in conjunction with [Neal's] admission of not having a prescription, 
could properly indicate to a reasonable finder of fact that [Neal], at least at some 
point, possessed methadone without a valid prescription." (R., pp.67-68.) 
Second, in Idaho, there is no distinction between circumstantial and direct 
evidence. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374-75, 247 P.3d 582, 601-02 
(2010); State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 723-24, 864 P.2d 162, 169-70 (Ct. 
App. 1993) ("The court properly instructed the jury that there is no distinction 
between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence as a means of proof and 
that neither is entitled to any greater weight than the other."); cf. State v. Suriner, 
154 Idaho 81, _, 294 P.3d 1093, 1099-00 (2013) (abandoning the corpus 
delicti rule). Thus, the fact that a positive blood test only qualifies as 
circumstantial evidence does not equate to the conclusion that the evidence is, 
alone, insufficient absent corroboration. Even if corroboration was necessary, 
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such evidence existed in this case in the form of Neal's admissions regarding 
prescription drug use during her pregnancy.3 
Neal also contends that, should the Court find l.C. § 37-2732(c) is 
ambiguous as to the meaning of the term "possess," any ambiguity must be 
construed in her favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-21.) 
Because the statute is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. Barber 
v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted) ("[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, 
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] 
intended."). 
Because Neal has failed to establish the evidence was insufficient for 
purpose of probable cause, she has likewise failed to establish the district court 
erred in denying her motion to dismiss. 
3 The state sees no reason to distinguish between a positive blood test directly 
from Neal and a positive drug test from the cord blood for purposes of analyzing 
whether presence of a controlled substance in the blood is sufficient to establish 
probable cause of possession of that substance. Accordingly, the state will not 
address Neal's separate argument that there was insufficient probable cause 
because the methadone was in the cord blood as opposed to "her blood." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) The magistrate had sufficient evidence to infer that the 
source of the methadone in the umbilical cord was Neal. Had Neal proceeded to 
trial, she certainly could have presented evidence that the methadone in the cord 
blood came from another source. As for Neal's argument that she did not 
"control" the cord blood on April 4, 2011, the date alleged in the Information, 
because that was after she gave birth (Appellant's Brief, p.18), this does not 
provide any basis for finding a lack of probable cause because the Complaint 
alleges "on or about" (R., p.6) and, even assuming the possession charge must 
be predicated on the time of ingestion, Neal cannot seriously contend (nor did 
she below) that there are any notice or due process concerns for purposes of the 
preliminary hearing based on the specific date in the Complaint. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Neal's guilty plea to possession of methadone. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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